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Abstract: Individual perceptions of income distribution play a vital role in political economy and 
public finance models, yet there is litle evidence regarding their origins or accuracy. This study 
examines how individuals form these perceptions and explores their potential impact on preferences 
for redistribution. A tailored household survey provides original evidence on systematic biases in 
individuals’ evaluations of their own relative position in the income distribution. The study discusses 
one of the mechanisms that may generate such biases, based on the extrapolation of information from 
endogenous reference groups, and presents some suggestive evidence that this mechanism has 
significant explanatory power. The impact of these biased perceptions on atitudes toward 
redistributive policies is studied by means of an experimental design that was incorporated into the 
survey, which provided consistent information on the own-ranking within the income distribution to a 
randomly selected group of respondents. The evidence suggests that those who had overestimated 
their relative position and thought that they were relatively richer than they were tend to demand 
higher levels of redistribution when informed of their true ranking. 
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1.Introduction 
The shape of the income distribution plays a key role in the determination of policies with 
redistributive components (such as those dealing with social security, health care, 
government transfers and taxation) in political economy models. However, the main policy 
determinant is not its actual shape, but rather how it is perceived by agents in the economy. 
Additionaly, individuals’ perceptions of the income distribution can afect how they wil 
react to redistributive policies (for instance, through tax evasion), which is a key input for 
public finance models. This study fils a gap in the literature by exploring the origins and 
consequences of systematic biases in individuals’ perceptions of aggregate income 
distributions. 
The findings presented in this paper contribute to the recent literature on the 
incorporation of subjective perceptions and inference problems into the determination of 
political economy outcomes (for a seminal contribution, see Pikety, 1995). For instance, 
when forming their views on public policies, agents may need to infer the importance of 
effort and of predetermined factors in the income generation process (Pikety, 1995; Bénabou 
and Tirole, 2006); in so doing, they may evaluate the prospects for economic mobility 
(Bénabou and Ok, 2001; Alesina and La Ferara, 2005), or they may arive at conclusions as 
to the causes of poverty and the fairness of socioeconomic outcomes in general (Alesina and 
Glaeser, 2004). To form their judgments, views and atitudes, agents need to make 
complicated inferences about distributional outcomes (e.g., inequality, mobility) based on 
limited information and within given time constraints, but there is as yet litle evidence on the 
origins or the accuracy of the inferences they make in this regard. 
This paper also makes a contribution to a growing body of work that atempts to 
document agents’ expectations and subjective probabilities (Manski, 2004; Hurd, 2009) and 
to explain how they are formed (Zafar, 2011). In an application to distributional issues, 
Norton and Ariely (2011) elicit information on Americans’ perceptions of the wealth 
distribution in their society and find significant discrepancies between actual and perceived 
levels of inequality. This paper documents systematic differences between objective and 
subjective income distributions and sheds light on the origins of these discrepancies. Most 
importantly, an experimental design makes it possible to test whether corecting these biases 
has an impact on stated preferences for redistribution. 
The assessment of an income distribution by an economic agent can be regarded, 
fundamentaly, as a statistical inference problem. Individuals observe the income levels of no 
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more than a sub-sample of the population and must then infer the entire distribution from that 
information. If agents do not fuly account for the selection process involved in the formation 
of the sample that they observe, their inferences wil be systematicaly biased. This failure 
may be due to limitations in the available information set which arise from the fact that 
information may be costly or difficult to obtain. Alternatively, agents may have the necessary 
information, but they may sometimes fail to use it correctly, as argued in the cognitive bias 
literature. Irespective of whether agents have limited information or bounded rationality, this 
rationalization of distributional perceptions provides a series of corolaries that can be tested 
with data on objective and perceived distributions. The same data can be used to study biases 
and preferences for redistribution, which is the main focus of this study. 
The empirical results presented in this paper are based on the Survey on Distributional 
Perceptions and Redistribution, a study of 1,100 representative households in Greater Buenos 
Aires in Argentina. The survey was designed and implemented in 2009 for the specific 
purpose of testing the posited mechanisms for the formation of distributional perceptions. 
Data were colected on each respondent’s household income and on his or her assessment of 
its ranking (to the closest decile) in the overal income distribution. 
The first finding is that systematic biases are present in perceptions of own income 
rank: a significant portion of poorer individuals place themselves in higher positions than 
they actualy occupy, while a significant proportion of richer individuals underestimate their 
rank. Moreover, as predicted, the bias is significantly corelated with the respondents’ 
relative positions within the reference group (as proxied by area of residence). Also in 
keeping with the posited mechanisms, respondents with friends from heterogeneous social 
backgrounds are less prone to these biases. 
Finaly, the study explores how these misperceptions about the income distribution 
may afect atitudes toward redistribution. For instance, self-interest might induce poor 
individuals to demand less redistribution if they think they are relatively richer than they 
actualy are. This study presents the results from a unique randomized experiment that was 
implemented within the survey: for a randomly assigned treatment group, the interviewer 
highlighted any discrepancy between the subjective assessment of the respondent’s ranking 
and that respondent’s actual position, effectively correcting any bias that was present. This 
survey field experiment contributes to the literature on information provision as a treatment 
(Duflo and Saez, 2003; Chety and Saez, 2009; Card et al., 2010). An original feature is that 
perceptions are not only contrasted with reality (as in Olken, 2009, among others). In 
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addition, in this survey experiment, biased subjects were provided with feedback and were 
actualy confronted with accurate information. 
The results from the experiment indicate that confronting agents’ biased perceptions 
with accurate information had a significant efect on their stated preferences for 
redistribution. Those who underestimated their income ranking did not change their atitudes 
toward redistribution when provided with accurate information about their income ranking. 
However, those who overestimated their relative position (i.e., who thought that they were 
relatively richer than they are) and who were provided with accurate information demanded 
more redistribution than those in the control group. To the degree that the information 
treatment managed to corect biased distributional perceptions, these results can be 
interpreted as evidence of the efect of biases in distributional perceptions on political 
atitudes. This finding constitutes an alternative to theories that posit prospects of upward 
mobility (Bénabou and Ok, 2001) or other factors as accounting for the relatively low levels 
of demand for redistribution in modern democracies. 
This paper is organized as folows. The next section discusses the formation of 
subjective income distributions and individuals’ perceptions of their income rank and then 
goes on to explore these factors’ implications for atitudes toward redistribution. The third 
section describes the household survey and outlines the randomized experiment that was 
designed to answer these questions. The fourth section presents the empirical results on 
biased perceptions of income distribution, and the fifth section describes the identification 
strategy and the results from the experiment on biases and preferences for redistribution. The 
last section concludes. 
 
2.Subjective income distributions, potential biases and 
preferences for redistribution 
Economic agents’ assessments of income distributions depend on their access to information 
and on their ability to process the relevant data. The later is a trivial consideration in a 
perfect information context, where the incomes of al members of society are observed. 
However, in the presence of limited information, these assessments become statistical 
inference problems. 
Individuals are constantly exposed to the income levels of others through, for 
instance, the media and social interaction with acquaintances, co-workers, employees, etc. 
Agents can be deemed sophisticated if they apply Bayes’ rule to infer the income distribution 
  5
for the entire population from the subset that they observe. A naïve agent is denoted by a 
failure to fuly apply Bayes’ rule. This failure can result in biased perceptions of the overal 
income distribution.1 
An agent may arrive at naïve estimates under certain circumstances. First, the 
information about the income distribution may be costly to acquire, or the advantages of 
doing so may not be evident. It may be the case that, as in Benoît and Dubra (2011), the naïve 
estimate represents the best possible answer that can arise from rational agents’ 
extrapolations conditioned on the information set available to them. Alternatively, individuals 
may fail to consider al the available information, or they may use it incorrectly (Simon, 
1972). For example, agents may use heuristics or rules of thumb when dealing with dificult 
questions of statistical inference, and such rules of thumb can be very imprecise. Indeed, the 
use of heuristics in statistical inference and the systematic biases that such an exercise entails 
is a wel-documented phenomenon in the cognitive literature (Kahneman, Slovic and 
Tversky, 1982). The most relevant case in this discussion is the representativeness heuristic, 
in which individuals fail to apply Bayes’ rule to the information they obtain (Kahneman and 
Tversky, 1972). This failure leads to a systematic cognitive bias: the base-rate neglect.2 
These two possibilities, limitations in information and bounded rationality, can be 
ilustrated by an extreme situation in which a naïve agent uses the information about the 
income distribution within his or her reference group as if it were representative of the entire 
population. If the formation of reference groups does not depend on income, then, on 
expectation, every group wil be representative of the whole population. In this case, it would 
be consistent to use the within-group distribution as an estimate of the distribution for the 
entire population. Selection into a reference group, however, is probably a function of 
income, with agents who have “rich” reference groups being more likely to observe higher-
income individuals and vice-versa. 
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
Figure 1 ilustrates the systematic biases that may arise with naïve agents. Figure 1a 
depicts the income distribution for the whole population and for a rich reference group, which 
exhibits first-order stochastic dominance over the distribution for the whole population (i.e., 
for every income level in the reference group there is a greater share of people below that 
income level than in the whole population). Since naïve agents use the information which 
                              
1 Cruces et al. (2011) provide a lengthier and more detailed discussion of the factors at work in the context of a 
statistical inference problem. 
2 The base-rate neglect has been incorporated in economic models and empirical applications before (see 
Grether, 1990, and the reviews by Rabin, 1998, and DelaVigna, 2009). 
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they have about the income distribution within their reference group as if it were 
representative of the entire population, naïve agents in the rich reference group will 
underestimate the actual cumulative income distribution for every income level. In Figure 1a, 
this is illustrated for a given income 1y  by the difference between the areas filled with 
horizontal and vertical lines. Conversely, naïve agents with poor reference groups will 
overestimate the cumulative income distribution for every income y. The results are not 
straightforward when there is no stochastic dominance of the distribution within a reference 
group over that of the whole population. Figure 1b illustrates this result by showing a middle-
income reference group, where agents underestimate F(y) for income levels y<y* and 
overestimate F(y) for incomes y>y*. 
Agents with biased perceptions will obtain naïve estimates of many characteristics of 
the income distribution, such as the mean, median, dispersion and proportion of individuals 
under the poverty line, among others. For instance, if reference groups are more 
homogeneous in income than the total population (as is likely to be the case), perceptions 
about income inequality will be biased downward for all agents. This is consistent with 
Norton’s and Ariely’s (2011) finding that individuals systematically underestimate the level 
of inequality in the distribution of wealth in the United States.  
A crucial parameter for this study is the perception of an agent’s own income rank 
within the distribution. Since agents with rich reference groups underestimate all points in the 
cumulative distribution, it follows that they will underestimate their own rank in the 
distribution. Conversely, naïve agents with poor reference groups will overestimate their 
rank. 
The main motivation for this discussion of biases is that misperceptions of the income 
distribution can have substantial implications for the determination of policy outcomes.  This 
can be illustrated by incorporating biased perceptions into a basic framework like that of 
Meltzer and Richard (1981) with a simple redistributive scheme in which taxes on incomes 
above some cut-off point are used to finance benefits for agents with incomes below this 
level. If agents have biased perceptions of their own rank in the income distribution, their 
evaluations of how these costs and benefits will affect them are likely to be inaccurate. Naïve 
agents with poor reference groups will overestimate their own ranking in the overall 
distribution and may erroneously believe that they would not benefit from further income 
redistribution when they actually would. With access to the correct information about their 
actual place in the income distribution, self-interest would make these individuals change 
their attitude and favor, rather than oppose, the redistributive policy. An analogous reasoning 
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applies to individuals with rich reference groups. The experimental design of the survey used 
in this study alows for a direct test of this mechanism. 
It should be noted that the recent political economy literature has discussed at length 
the fact that individuals may be motivated by more than self-interest, which implies that 
preferences for redistribution may reflect a wider set of factors.3 As a result, providing 
accurate information on the income distribution to naïve individuals may have conflicting 
efects in terms of their support for redistribution from the perspective of selfish and altruistic 
motives. The experiment described below identifies the net efect that providing accurate 
information on the income distribution wil have on atitudes toward redistributive policies. 
 
3.Data source and experimental setup: Survey on Distributional 
Perceptions and Redistribution 
3.1.Survey on Distributional Perceptions and Redistribution 
The discussion in the previous section covered the formation of subjective income 
distributions, the possibility of systematic biases, and their implications for atitudes toward 
redistribution. The empirical research described in this paper is based on the Survey on 
Distributional Perceptions and Redistribution, a study of 1,100 representative households 
representative in Greater Buenos Aires, Argentina. The survey was caried out in March 2009 
and consisted of face-to-face interviews with a random sample of that population. It was 
specificaly designed to test the mechanisms discussed in the previous section and, to that 
end, colected data on a set of individual and household characteristics and on respondents’ 
labor-market and other socioeconomic outcomes, as wel as their answers to a series of 
questions about their political views and atitudes. It also gathered information on the 
respondents’ actual household income and on their perceptions of their own income rank 
within the distribution for the whole country. 
There are several ways of recovering subjective probability distributions for a 
continuous variable such as income, which include eliciting quantiles, moments or points of 
the distribution (see Manski, 2004). For instance, Norton and Ariely (2011) colected 
information on respondents’ evaluations of the proportional distribution of total wealth 
among quintiles in the United States. The Survey on Distributional Perceptions and 
Redistribution relied on an original instrument (the income-rank evaluation question), which 
                              
3 Fong (2001), Lutmer (2001), Rotemberg (2002), Alesina and Glaeser (2004) and Alesina and Angeletos 
(2005) study the efect of altruistic and fairness concerns on atitudes toward redistribution. See Alesina and 
Giuliano (2009) for more references. 
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elicited a specific value for the cumulative subjective distribution: its evaluation at the point 
where each respondent thought his or her household stood.4 The question was worded as 
folows: “There are 10 milion households in Argentina. Of those 10 milion, how many do 
you think have an income lower than yours?”5 The survey also colected data on the 
households’ total monthly income by intervals. While distributional indicators often rely on 
per capita or adjusted income, a pilot conducted in December 2007 indicated that individuals 
compare incomes in terms of total monthly household levels. The intervals were chosen by 
the research team to corespond to the boundaries of deciles of the total national household 
income distribution at the time of the survey in order to facilitate the comparison of objective 
and perceived positions in the distribution using the experimental design.6 
 
3.2.The survey experiment setup 
Besides the income-rank question, the second and most innovative aspect of the survey was 
the implementation of an experimental design that was incorporated into the questionnaire. 
Randomized questionnaire-experiments have been developed in laboratory setings (Cowel 
and Cruces, 2004), while, in the context of household surveys and public opinion research, 
Horiuchi et al. (2007), Di Tela, Galiani and Schargrodsky (2008) and Hainmueler and 
Hiscox (2010) have conducted survey experiments with random alocations of questionnaire 
types among respondents. 
As in these previous studies, the experimental setup for this survey involved randomly 
alocating two diferent types of questionnaires to interviewees, although the questions posed 
to the respondents were the same. The original feature of this setup has to do with the nature 
of the treatment, with the interviewer providing feedback to respondents in the treatment 
group in the form of accurate information concerning the income distribution. Specificaly, 
after colecting information on household characteristics, income levels and positional 
perceptions, the interviewer informed respondents in the treatment group whether their 
estimates of relative income coincided with those of the research team. The interviewer read 
                              
4 Nuñez (2005) colected information about the respondents’ evaluation of the percentage of households above 
and below their income level in Chile. The approximate number of households in Argentina at the time of the 
survey (10 milion) alowed the question to be phrased in terms of milions of households on a simple 1-10 
scale, thus eliminating the need for respondents to be comfortable with answering in percentage terms. 
5 This information difers conceptualy from measures of subjective economic welfare (Ravalion and Lokshin, 
2002), since it atempts to capture an objective parameter of the distribution. In this sense, it is closer to the 
literature on elicitation of subjective probabilities (Hurd, 2009). 
6 The use of income intervals significantly reduces non-response rates. The notes provided in Table A1 (see the 
appendix) provide further details on the construction of the intervals and their implementation by interviewers in 
the survey. 
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the folowing statement (with X and Y being determined by previous answers): “Based on 
your income level, the latest studies conducted by the University indicate that there are X 
milion households with an income lower than yours, while you stated that there were Y.” 
The interviewer then read out one of the three folowing statements, depending on the 
accuracy of the X/Y comparison: (1) “In fact, there are more households with a lower 
income than yours than you thought”, (2) “You were right about how many households have 
a lower income than yours”, or (3) “In fact, there are fewer households with a lower income 
than yours than you thought.” The presence of a bias in their perceptions was thus explicitly 
pointed out to respondents in the treatment group. After the treatment, the questionnaire was 
used to colect information on atitudes about specific redistributive policies of interest in 
Argentina within the political context existing at the time of the survey. The questionnaire for 
the control group did not contain the “feedback” section, but was exactly the same in al other 
respects. (Table A1 presents an extract of the questionnaire and variable definitions.) 
This experimental survey design contributes to a growing body of literature 
concerning the provision of information as a treatment in an experimental seting. For 
example, Duflo and Saez (2003) and Chety and Saez (2009) provided subjects with 
information on retirement plans and the tax code, respectively, while Jensen’s (2010) study 
offered statistics on returns to schooling for teenagers, and Card et al. (2010) gave a group of 
employees access to information on co-workers’ wages. There are also several studies that 
have contrasted subjective and objective probabilities and their relationship with actual 
outcomes in connection with, for instance, income expectations versus realizations (Manski, 
2004), objective versus subjective income percentiles (Nuñez, 2005) and perceived versus 
actual survival rates (Hurd, 2009). This study innovated in a crucial way, however, by 
confronting subjects with accurate information which differed from their stated perceptions. 
 
4.Evidence on perceptions of income distributions 
4.1.Subjective income distributions 
This section presents an analysis of the distribution of objective and perceived income 
rankings derived from the Survey on Distributional Perceptions and Redistribution. Figure 2a 
gives the income distribution of the Greater Buenos Aires survey sample as a function of 
deciles of the national distribution at the time of the survey, which served as the basis for the 
categories used for the household income question. A nationaly representative sample would 
be depicted in the figure as a horizontal line at a 10 percent density. The higher concentration 
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in deciles 5 to 9 is accounted for by the presence of higher average income levels in Buenos 
Aires relative to the countrywide average. Figure 2b, in turn, presents the respondents’ 
perceptions of their households’ positions in the distribution, which were elicited by posing 
the income-rank evaluation question described in the previous section. By construction, 
respondents identified what decile of the national distribution they thought was the closest to 
their income level. In contrast with the fairly even distribution shown in Figure 2a, the mode 
of the perceptions distribution is given by the fifth decile, with almost 30 percent of 
respondents placing their households at that level (and almost half in the middle quintile – 
corresponding to the fifth and sixth deciles). Self-perceptions of income rank in the sample 
were thus substantially less dispersed than objective income levels are. 
[FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
The difference between the two panels in Figure 2 indicates the presence of a bias in 
distributional perceptions. The bias is defined here as the difference between a household’s 
objective income decile and the respondent’s self-assessment of its position (in deciles): those 
with a negative bias consider themselves to be in a lower position than they really are, while 
the opposite is true for those with a positive bias. Table 1 presents summary statistics for this 
variable by objective income quintile. In all, 30 percent of respondents had positive biases, 
while 55 percent exhibited a negative bias: only about 15 percent of the respondents placed 
their household’s income in the objectively correct decile. However, the deciles of a national 
income distribution are relatively narrow categories, and it is plausible that respondents could 
have difficulty in ascertaining their position with such precision. In any case, the proportion 
of biased individuals is more than 55 percent when considering only respondents who deviate 
from their true position by two deciles or more (see Cruces et al., 2011, for a lengthier 
discussion). 
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
Table 1 also illustrates the relationship between the distributions of objective and 
perceived relative income levels depicted in Figure 2. It is readily apparent that the average 
perceived own decile increases monotonically by quintile of objective income, although the 
range of the average perceived decile (from 4.60 for the bottom quintile to 6.48 for the top 
quintile) indicates that the distribution of perceptions is considerably more concentrated than 
that of objective income. This pattern has a direct correlate for the distribution of the bias in 
Table 1: respondents at the top and the bottom of the objective distribution display substantial 
negative and positive biases, respectively (of about -2.88 and 2.98 deciles for the extreme 
categories). Moreover, the bias diminishes up to the middle objective quintile, where it is 
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close to zero, and increases monotonicaly (in absolute values) from there onward. The table 
also indicates that positive biases are largely confined to respondents below the median of the 
distribution, while those with a negative bias are concentrated in the fourth and fifth quintiles. 
 
4.2.Reference groups and biased perceptions of income distribution 
The discussion so far has revealed the presence of substantial biases in distributional 
perceptions. Section 2 posited a mechanism for the formation of subjective income 
distributions, whereby individuals extrapolated from information about the income 
distribution in their reference groups in order to obtain estimates for the whole population. If 
reference groups bundle together individuals of similar income levels, then one simple 
prediction is that individuals with rich reference groups (and therefore most rich individuals) 
tend to underestimate their income rank, whereas individuals with poor reference groups (and 
therefore most poor individuals) overestimate their rank. This distribution of biases 
coresponds to the one depicted in Table 1. However, the observed patern is also consistent 
with other potential explanations. For instance, poorer respondents may feel embarrassed to 
admit that their income is low and thus may over-report their true (accurate) perception, 
while richer individuals may not feel comfortable reporting their high relative position7 and 
thus may under-report their true (accurate) perception. The goal of this section is to test some 
predictions that are specific to the reference-group hypothesis. A further hypothesis is 
discussed in detail in the folowing subsection. 
In the discussion presented in Section 2, the entire set of individual interactions (with 
friends, family, co-workers, etc.) was considered to constitute the relevant reference group for 
the formation of perceptions of income distribution. The analysis here uses a geographical 
proxy: the respondents’ area of residence. Although it is not the best proxy for reference 
groups, the area of residence provides a simple ilustration of a reference-group selection 
mechanism based on income levels, given the pervasive residential segregation of households 
by income levels in urban areas (Glaeser et al., 2008).8 The survey covered 41 randomly 
                              
7 Under-reporting of income for higher levels is typicaly a concern in household surveys. However, in this case, 
the tendency of those with higher income levels to underestimate their position implies that under-reporting at 
the top of the distribution would reduce the number of those classified as biased. The substantial number of 
respondents with a negative bias can be considered to be a lower bound. 
8 The literature on interpersonal comparisons of wel-being also proposes a geographic proxy for reference 
groups (Clark et al., 2008). The social networks literature also highlights the importance of area of residence for 
the exchange of information on employment and other income-generating activities (Bayer et al., 2008). 
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selected sampling points (refered to as “neighborhoods” in the discussion) within 10 
localities of the Greater Buenos Aires metropolitan area.9 
The discussion in Section 2 pointed out that fuly naïve agents wil report their 
positions within their reference groups as their perceptions of their income ranks within the 
whole population; for “partialy naïve” agents, relative income levels within the reference 
group wil stil be partialy corelated to those agents’ perceptions of their income ranking. 
On the other hand, if individuals correctly apply Bayes’ rule, relative income within a 
reference group should not have any explanatory power for perceived own-income rank 
within the population after controling for the agent’s objective overal position. 
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
To ilustrate the relevance of the reference-group hypothesis, Table 2 presents a series 
of regressions where the perceived own-income decile is the dependent variable.10 Column 1 
presents a simple regression with the respondents’ objective income deciles as the sole 
independent variable. The results in this column confirm the existence of a highly significant 
relationship between the two variables discussed above, with the coefficient being positive. 
This coefficient fals short of 1 partly because of systematic biases in perceptions, but also 
because of the atenuation bias stemming from the presence of measurement error in the 
independent variable. The second column repeats this simple regression, but includes 41 
neighborhood fixed efects: the coeficient is stil significant at the 1 percent level, although it 
is slightly lower.11 
The first test of the geographic reference-group hypothesis is presented in column 3. 
The regression includes the respondents’ income rank within their localities (the number of 
households within sampling points is too smal to provide a meaningful measure), converted 
to the same 1-10 scale used for the objective and subjective deciles. With the inclusion of the 
locality rank variable as an independent variable, the coeficient of the objective income 
decile variable is virtualy zero and not significant at standard levels. The coefficient of the 
locality rank variable, on the other hand, has a positive and statisticaly significant coefficient 
of 0.2151. The respondents’ relative incomes within their localities thus seem to have a 
strong correlation with their perceptions of the distribution, even after controling for their 
                              
9 The sampling points correspond to a fairly smal set of street blocks and contain 26 households, on average, in 
the sample. The average objective income level reported in the survey within each neighborhood ranges from an 
average objective decile of 3 to just below 8. 
10 Regressions with the bias as the dependent variable do not convey meaningful results because, by 
construction, the bias is strongly corelated with the objective income decile. 
11 Standard errors are clustered at the neighborhood level. Al the results in the table are similar if 10 locality 
fixed efects (with robust standard erors) are included instead. 
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objective income levels. This result does not arise from a high colinearity between objective 
income and rank within locality, as shown by the regression in column 4, which includes 
objective income deciles as a series of 9 indicator variables. The coefficient of relative 
income within a locality is statisticaly significant and about the same in size as in column 3, 
and the F-test cannot reject the hypothesis that the objective income indicators are al equal to 
zero (p-value of 0.24). 
The folowing column in Table 2 presents the results of another robustness check. A 
potential concern may be that the measure of objective income is imprecise, so that the 
locality income-rank variable may be indirectly capturing the efects of unobserved variations 
in actual income levels. The model in column 5 includes a set of additional regressors 
consisting of individual and household characteristics to proxy for the respondent’s income-
generating capacity (his or her education level, that of his or her spouse, age, gender, type of 
employment – see the notes included in Table 2 for details). If the locality rank captures some 
of the omited variables, its coefficient should decrease substantialy with the introduction of 
these controls. The results shown in column 5 of Table 2 indicate that adding this exhaustive 
set of controls does not significantly alter the point estimate or the statistical significance of 
the coefficient of the rank-within-locality variable. 
Finaly, Table 2 also presents the results of a further test of the reference-group 
hypothesis. The survey included a question intended to measure the breadth of respondents’ 
reference groups: “Among your friends and co-workers, would you say that there are 
individuals from al social classes (1), or, if not, that most of your friends belong to the lower 
class (2), the middle class (3), or the upper class (4)?” The response is used to generate an 
indicator variable that takes the value 1 if an individual answered that his or her friends are 
from al social classes (38.5 percent of the respondents) and zero otherwise. Intuitively, 
people who interact with several distinct groups must have more information about the role of 
income in forming reference groups (or, alternatively, the selection process is more salient for 
them, so they are less likely to fail to consider Bayes’ rule). As a consequence, they should be 
less inclined to report their relative position within their locality as an estimate of their 
ranking in the entire distribution. The regression shown in column 6 includes this indicator 
variable, as wel as its interaction with the respondents’ income rank within the locality. The 
coeficient of the interaction is negative and significant, as expected: conditional on their own 
objective income level, individuals with broader reference groups should be less influenced 
by their relative income within their neighborhood. However, the coeficient of the variable 
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without the interaction is also significant, indicating some corelation between income rank 
and this variable. 
 
4.3.Alternative explanations 
Section 4.2 presented suggestive evidence that the reference-group conjecture presented in 
Section 2 can explain a substantial variation in the observed distribution of biases. However, 
other competing or complementary explanations may also account for the observed paterns. 
A powerful alternative hypothesis is the prevalence of focal-point answers. For instance, 
individuals may have a tendency to the mean (or the median), as has actualy been 
documented in the literature on expectations and subjective probabilities. Hurd (2009) points 
out that “when the true probability of an event is greater than 0.50 […] the subjective 
probability wil be understated” and vice versa, and provides several examples of survey 
responses with focal points at 50 for distributions of between 0 and 100. 
In this study, anchoring to the middle of the scale would be a concern if it is induced 
by epistemic uncertainty, which implies that individuals use the “50 percent” response when 
assessing probabilities in cases where, in fact, they do not know the answer to the question 
(Bruine de Bruin et al., 2002). Bruine de Bruin and Carman (2012) find strong evidence in 
support of this hypothesis in the context of questions about the probability of own-survival 
for adults. This would translate into a clustering of answers in the fifth (or sixth) decile and 
would generate paterns similar to those documented in Section 4.1 (e.g., rich people 
apparently tend to underestimate their own income ranking, while the poor tend to do the 
opposite). However, these biases could be an artifact created by the respondents’ lack of 
knowledge rather than by the influence of reference groups. 
A second auxiliary survey was conducted to provide a formal means of testing 
whether epistemic uncertainty plays a role in the biases documented in Section 4.2. Power 
calculations indicated that a smaler sample was needed, and a final sample of 302 completed 
questionnaires was therefore used.12 The questionnaire included a smal set of background 
questions on such maters as age, gender, education and income level (proxied by decile), as 
wel as the own-income-rank evaluation question. Building on Bruine de Bruin and Carman 
(2012), immediately after the rank perception question, the respondent was asked the 
                              
12 The survey design is identical to that of the Survey on Distributional Perceptions and Redistribution. It was 
implemented on February 11 and 12, 2012. It consisted of 302 face-to-face interviews of people in a random 
sampling based on 24 sampling points in the Greater La Plata metropolitan area (the capital of the Province of 
Buenos Aires and its suroundings). This area borders the Greater Buenos Aires metropolitan area, where the 
original survey was caried out, and has a similar socioeconomic profile. 
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folowing: “You just told me that X milion households have a lower income than yours. How 
sure are you of the answer that you just gave?” There were four possible options for a 
response to this question: “Not sure at al”, selected by 8 percent of the respondents; 
“Somewhat sure” (48 percent); “Sure” (37 percent); and “Very sure” (7 percent). The average 
for the variable (coded as 1 to 4) is 2.43, with a standard deviation of 0.74. 
[FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
As depicted in Figure 3, the average of the confidence variable (coded as 1 to 4) is not 
significantly different for those placing themselves at deciles 5 or 6 and, in fact, the 
confidence intervals are consistent with a roughly constant level of confidence in responses 
across the entire distribution of perceived deciles. The hypothesis of no diferences in 
certainty between respondents with a perceived own-decile equal to 5 and the rest cannot be 
rejected for conventional significance levels. The same patern of results remains with 
alternative definitions of certainty (e.g., indicators for “Not sure at al”, or for “Not sure at 
al” and “Somehow sure”), as wel as when comparing those who selected deciles 5 or 6 with 
the rest of the respondents (results not reported). In summary, epistemic uncertainty does not 
seem to be a predominant force underlying the systematic biases in perceptions of own-
income rank documented above. This might be due to the fact that the own-income-rank 
evaluation question was phrased in terms of “milions of households” having lower incomes 
than the respondent’s – that is, as a question about frequencies rather than one designed to 
elicit a reply given in terms of percentages or probabilities (see the discussion of frequency 
representations and biases in Melers, Hertwig and Kahneman, 2001). 
 
5.Biased perceptions and preferences for redistribution: 
experimental results 
5.1.Identification strategy 
As described in Section 3, the survey included a field questionnaire-experiment: the 
interviewer provided a randomly assigned group of respondents with unbiased estimates of 
their positions in the income distribution, pointing out the degree and direction of the bias in 
each respondent’s self-assessment (if any). This section discusses the causal effect of this 
information treatment on preferences for redistribution.13 
                              
13 This discussion has its origins in a suggestion by an anonymous referee. 
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Let the expression )(xFr iii  represent the (potentialy biased) perception of an 
agent’s own income rank in the income distribution. Let )(rid  be a function that maps out the 
relationship between an individual’s perceived rank and his or her demand for redistribution. 
For example, )(d  can represent a binary variable denoting support for a program that taxes 
households above a given quantile and redistributes it to individuals below that quantile. In 
the simple Meltzer and Richard (1981) framework discussed in Section 2, where agents are 
purely selfish, )(d  would be 1 for individuals below the cutof quantile and zero for those 
above the cutof. 
However, preferences for redistribution are not necessarily that simple. The shape of 
the function )(d  depends on the underlying individual preferences for redistribution in the 
population under study. While )(d  may be monotonicaly decreasing in income if only self-
interest is at work, several of the factors discused in Section 2 indicate that this relationship 
might not be monotonic in income. For instance, a U-shaped function )(d  would denote a 
situation where a redistributive program is supported by those with very high and very low 
income levels. 
The informational treatment in the experimental setup can be assumed to afect 
individual preferences for redistribution through its efect on ir, the perceived own-income 
rank. Expressing rankings in terms of deciles, when an individual who thinks that he or she is 
in decile ir is informed that his/her position is actualy in decile iq, the resulting change in 
that individual’s perception could be modeled by an update function )(u : the new perception 
is )q,r(r iii u . If ri>qi (if the individual initialy perceived his/her income rank as higher than 
it actualy is), then )q,r( iiu  is expected to be negative – i.e., the individual updates his/her 
beliefs downward. Since the informational treatment is relatively weak, consisting of a verbal 
remark made by the interviewer,14 it is likely that there wil be no more than a partial 
updating of perceptions: iiii q-r)q,r( u . This condition implies also that 0)q,r( ii u if 
ii qr . 
Providing individuals with objective information about their income rank (iq) has the 
folowing efect on support for redistribution: )(r-))q,r(r( iiii dudSupport  . The 
identification of this efect depends on several factors. A first issue is that, given a pair (ri,qi), 
                              
14 This is a substantialy weaker treatment than that used in some other studies, such as the information provided 
about taxes and benefits in Chety and Saez (2009). The significant results presented in the folowing pages are 
thus al the more remarkable, since they stem from a relatively weak treatment. 
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under the nul hypothesis of a zero-treatment efect, it is not possible to determine whether 
the absence of a significant efect is due to the fact that the provision of information did not 
afect the individual’s perception, 0)q,r( ii u ; whether it changed the perception but the 
support was not afected by this change, i.e. )(r))q,r(r( iiii dud   even though 0)q,r( ii u ; 
or both.15 
A second issue is that the treatment efect can be very heterogeneous, depending on 
the shape of both functions )(d  and )(u . An ideal empirical setup would estimate the effect 
of the informational treatment for each separate pair (ri,qi). For instance, the experimental 
design would randomly provide information within the group of individuals with a perceived 
own-income decile equal to 5 and an objective income decile equal to 2, and so forth for 
every possible pair (ri,qi). However, this estimation would demand a very large sample size to 
ensure a critical number of individuals in each cel (ri,qi). 
In practice, since the sample size is limited, the empirical strategy must rely on the 
estimation of treatment effects for coarser subgroups of the population. The extreme case 
involves assuming that the effect of teling an individual that his/her perception of own-
income rank is biased by X deciles is symmetric: e.g., the effect of teling an individual with 
a perceived own-income decile equal to 5 that he/she is actualy in decile 4 has the same 
magnitude (but opposite sign) as the efect of teling an individual with a perceived own-
income decile equal to 5 that he/she is in fact in decile 6.16 However, there are important 
reasons to believe that the treatment efect is not symmetric for those with positive and 
negative biases. 
[FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
First, the indicators of support for redistribution discussed below do not appear to be 
monotonic in perceived rank, implying that the shape of the function )(d  folows a more 
complex patern. Figure 4 depicts the average agreement with a question as to whether the 
government should help the poor with monetary subsidies by level of objective and perceived 
own-income decile for the control group in the experiment (those who did not receive 
feedback from the interviewer on their actual position in the distribution). While the average 
                              
15 For example, if an individual’s level of support is the same with a perceived own-income decile equal to 7 and 
8, and that individual perceives his or her position to be at 8 when the income level actualy corresponds to 
decile 7, providing that  individual with unbiased information wil not afect his/her support for redistribution 
even if it successfuly changes the individual’s perception of his/her relative income. 
16 Another simplifying assumption might be that the effect is linear: for instance, the efect of informing an 
individual with a perceived own-income decile equal to 5 that he/she is actualy in decile 4 should be half as 
great as the efect of corecting the perception by two deciles (i.e, from a perception of an own-income decile of 
5 to an objective decile of 3). 
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of this variable is higher for the three lowest perceived own-income deciles, this relationship 
does not appear to be monotone. More precisely, the findings suggest that informing 
individuals who perceive themselves as being in the middle of the distribution that they 
actualy are among the poorest would have a substantialy greater efect on preferences for 
redistribution (in absolute values) than the efect on those preferences that would be 
generated by informing individuals who place themselves in the middle of the distribution 
that they are richer than they thought. 
A second source of asymmetry in the treatment effect for those with positive and 
negative biases is that the function )(u  may differ substantialy between those two groups of 
individuals. Those with negative biases tend to be in the upper half of the income distribution 
and therefore tend to have not only higher incomes but also higher levels of education. Richer 
and more educated individuals may be beter informed and thus more confident about their 
beliefs (i.e., a Bayesian prior with lower variance), which would make them less reactive to 
the informational treatment. This intuition is supported by data from the auxiliary survey 
described in Section 4.3. Figure 3 indicates that those in the top perceived own-income decile 
appear to be more certain about their assessment of their position in the income distribution 
than those in the botom decile. Moreover, more educated individuals report significantly 
higher levels of confidence in their assesment of their own relative rank (results not reported). 
Given these potential assymetries, the most natural choice is to estimate the effect of 
the informational treatment for three groups: those with a positive bias, those with a negative 
bias, and those without any bias. For respondents with no bias, the treatment simply confirms 
their perception of their own rank in the distribution. Since they do not receive any new 
information, the treatment should be immaterial to their stated preferences for redistribution. 
The existence of an impact of the treatment for this group could signal that the interviewer’s 
statement had an effect that was independent of its content, which could be dificult to 
separate from that of the actual information provided.17 The treatment ought to prompt those 
who overestimated their own rank to demand more help for the poor, insofar as it makes them 
more likely to consider themselves as potential beneficiaries of this type of policy. Finaly, 
for those who underestimated their rank, the treatment can be expected to make them less 
likely to believe that they wil benefit from the program, so self-interest should induce them 
                              
17 An efect of the treatment for this group could also indicate that the respondent is misreporting his or her 
income level, in which case the true informational content of the interviewer’s statement would not necessarily 
be a confirmation of the respondent’s self-assessment. The fact that there are no significant efects for this group 
is suggestive that under-reporting is not the driving force behind the revealed biases. 
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The focus of this study is on atitudes toward specific policies designed to help the poor 
rather than on general beliefs about justice and income redistribution. The questions used in 
this section are fairly general, but they refer to specific ways in which government programs 
to help the poor should be implemented. Direct government transfers to the poor were 
especialy relevant in the context of the population under study. The extension of family 
alowances (cash transfers which were made only to formal-sector workers, i.e., those with 
higher incomes) to the poor was a controversial issue in Argentina at the time that the survey 
was implemented in March 2009, a few months before a national midterm election. 
Opposition political parties, unions, academics and non-governmental organizations 
(including the Catholic Church) campaigned intensively for direct cash transfers to poor 
families, which were ultimately introduced by the federal government in November 2009 
(Cruces and Gasparini, 2010). The public debate at the time of the survey focused on this 
specific policy measure and on the details of its coverage and implementation. In addition to 
their pivotal role in the political debate of interest to the population under study, another 
advantage of studying preferences regarding broadly defined policies rather than broadly 
defined distributive principles is that government cash transfer programs can reach a 
substantial proportion of the population and can be fairly accurately targeted at the poor, 
unlike most of Argentina’s other items of public expenditure (Gasparini and Cruces, 2010). 
This implies that low-income respondents faced a significant probability of being directly 
affected by policy changes in this area.18 
Individuals in the treatment group were given unbiased information about their 
income ranking after they had reported their own perception. The post-treatment questions19 
in the survey were designed to capture respondents’ views on some of the prominent aspects 
of the public debate on distributional policy changes: whether to provide transfers to the poor 
or not and, if so, their modality (in cash, in kind or in some form of employment 
                              
18 A wel-targeted emergency program was implemented in 2002. It covered the poorest 20 percent of 
households in the country. The new cash transfer program (launched in 2009) reached a similar level of 
coverage and efectiveness in targeting in 2010, a year after its implementation (Cruces and Gasparini, 2010). 
19 Table A2 (see the appendix) presents the diferences in pre-treatment variables (i.e., the questions asked 
before the intervention by the interviewer in the treatment questionnaire) by treatment status. A simultaneous 
test indicates that these diferences are not significantly diferent from zero. 
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intermediation). The survey respondents were first asked: “Do you think that the government 
should help poor people by giving them money?” This question was answered positively by 
14.7 percent of the interviewees (ranging from 23.2 in the botom quintile to 9.5 percent in 
the top quintile). The survey also included what was essentialy the same question but in 
reference to food. This type of in-kind transfer was supported by 33.5 percent of respondents, 
with the percentage also decreasing monotonicaly by income level (42.1 to 22.1 percent for 
the same quintiles as above). Finaly, respondents were asked if the government should help 
the poor “by providing them with a job”; this option was supported by 98 percent of the 
respondents, with a virtualy constant proportion across income groups. While the low level 
of variation in this variable implies that it cannot be studied independently, it is included in 
the composite measures of support for redistribution. 
The corelation between the answers to the questions about money and food is 0.44 
and significant at the 1 percent level, which indicates that the joint analysis of these responses 
in a composite variable is warranted.20 The main dependent variable for the analysis consists 
of a composite indicator equal to the average response to the three forms of government 
assistance listed above. This has an average of 0.49 (ranging from 0.54 in the poorest quintile 
to 0.43 in the richest quintile). The results are also reported in terms of an alternative 
composite measure, a standardized index which removes the means and weights of each of 
the three measures by their standard deviations (Kling et al., 2007). This measure, reported in 
efect sizes, has a mean of zero and ranges from 0.134 in the poorest quintile to -0.117 in the 
richest quintile. 
[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
The dependent variables in Table 3 are the diferent measures of preferences for 
redistribution (mean support, standardized mean, help with money and help with food) and a 
fifth dependent variable, which equals 1 if the respondent reports having made a donation in 
the past 12 months (this is used as a falsification test, as discussed below). The results are 
presented for each of the treatment subgroups: those with a negative bias, those with a zero 
bias, and those with a positive bias. The first two rows in each panel display the means for 
each dependent variable by treatment status. The folowing row shows the diference between 
the two and the standard eror of this diference, with stars denoting the significance of the 
mean difference test. Finaly, the last row in each panel presents the results from the 
                              
20 There are several plausible explanations for the divergence between responses to the questions concerning the 
provision of assistance in the form of money and in the form of food. Most notably, respondents tend to prefer 
in-kind transfers (such as food transfers) because of paternalistic concerns (i.e., the belief that the poor might not 
spend cash on the “right” goods). 
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regression version of the test, i.e., the coefficient of the treatment indicator in an OLS 
regression that includes the same control variables from columns 5 and 6 of Table 2 (standard 
errors are also clustered at the neighborhood level).21 
The results shown in the second column of Table 3 indicate that some of the point 
estimates of the differences between treatment and controls for those with a zero bias are 
non-negligible. For instance, the diference for the mean of the three variables (first panel) is 
0.036. However, none of the diferences (conditional or unconditional) for any of the 
dependent variables that were considered are statisticaly diferent from zero. These results 
are compatible with the discussion in the previous section, which indicated that the treatment 
could be expected to have no efect on preferences for redistribution for this group. 
The first column of Table 3 presents the treatment effect for individuals with negative 
biases. The diferences between the treatment and control groups are relatively smal for al 
the dependent variables considered (positive for help with money and negative for help with 
food, and very close to zero for the two aggregate variables), with the exception of the 
donations variable, which exhibits slightly higher differences. None of the point estimates, 
however, are statisticaly significant at conventional levels. 
Finaly, the results for individuals with positive biases (those who overestimate their 
rank), shown in the third column, point to a series of relatively large and statisticaly 
significant diferences between treatments and control groups. As predicted, treated 
individuals in this group exhibited higher levels for the indices of support for redistribution. 
For instance, the unconditional (conditional) difference is 0.029 (0.071) for the mean support 
variable.22 The p-values of the unconditional diferences in the four outcomes of interest vary 
from 0.162 (mean support) to 0.236 (standardized mean), but the conditional diferences for 
the four variables are in al cases statisticaly significant at conventional levels for this group 
(at the 10 percent level for help with money, at the 5 percent level for help with food and the 
standardized mean, and at the 1 percent level for mean support). 
In line with the discussion presented in the previous subsection, the effect of the 
information treatment should be a function of the degree of bias in perceptions of the income 
                              
21 The inclusion of control variables can reduce the variability of the eror term, which increases the statistical 
power. This is an important adjustment in this context due to the smal sample size within each group. 
22 The main goal of using conditioning variables in an experimental seting is to improve eficiency. If the 
treatment assignment is randomized, in expectation, the inclusion of control variables should not change much 
the point estimates. Folowing Altonji et al. (2005), if the corelation between the treatment and the observables 
is informative about the corelation between the treatment and the unobservables, then the larger coeficients 
obtained when including controls indicate that the conditional difference under-estimates the true effect of the 
treatment. If the coefficients had decreased instead, the potential problem would be the over-estimation of the 
causal efect of the treatment. 
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distribution: 30.6 percent of those with a positive bias had a misperception of only one decile, 
and thus the informational treatment does not necessarily convey a strong message. The 
fourth column reports the treatment effects for the subsample of individuals who 
overestimated their own ranking by more than one decile.23 Since this group exhibits a 
substantialy larger gap between perceptions and the actual situation, the efect on support for 
redistribution can be expected to be stronger.24 The evidence set forth in Table 3 indicates 
that this is indeed the case: the treatments efects shown in the fourth column are 
substantialy higher than those shown in the third column and are statisticaly significant even 
for the unconditional estimates. The diferences in support for redistribution between the 
treatment and control groups are large and statisticaly significant for the two indices (both 
conditional and unconditional) and for the two components (the conditional and 
unconditional diference for help with money and the conditional diference for help with 
food).25 
Finaly, the botom panel in Table 3 presents a falsification test designed to capture 
the presence of any spurious efects of the treatment on respondents. These are estimates of 
the efect of the informational treatment on the variable defined by the post-treatment 
question: “Have you made any donations to an individual or charity during the past 12 
months?” This donation variable was included in the survey because of its close relationship 
to a wilingness to provide asistance to the poor. If the treatment has an efect through a 
change in the perceptions of own-income rank, it should have an impact on stated 
preferences, but should not afect the reporting of past actions. If, on the contrary, the 
provision of information induces more caring or generous statements from the respondent 
through a shaming efect, then the treatment should also have a (spurious) impact on 
statements about what the respondent did in the past. The results shown in the last rows of 
Table 3 indicate that, despite some sizeable differences between treatments and controls for 
some of the groups, none of these differences (conditional or unconditional) are statisticaly 
significant at the standard levels. 
                              
23 The analogous situation for the group considered in column one of the table would refer to those with a 
negative bias of two deciles or more. None of the differences (conditional or unconditional) in the preferences 
for redistribution variables are statisticaly significant at the standard levels for this group. These results are 
omited due to space constraints. 
24 The same intuition applies for other groups for which the information treatment indicated a large discrepancy 
between their perception and the actual situation. Cruces et al. (2011) report further robustness tests of this kind. 
25 However, as expected from the discussion of asymmetric reactions to the information treatment, there are no 
significant diferences in support for redistribution between the treatment and control groups among those with 
negative biases greater than 1 (in absolute values). 
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To sum up, the evidence for those with no bias in their perceptions supports the 
discussion in the previous section, which indicated that the treatment should not have an 
impact on preferences for redistribution for individuals in this group. Moreover, the evidence 
also suggests that the treatment did not have a systematic efect for individuals with negative 
biases. One plausible explanation for that finding is that the treatment afected perceptions 
but failed to impact atitudes toward redistribution because )(d  is roughly flat for the 
relevant range of income ranks. Alternatively, the informational treatment may not change 
the perceptions of own-income rank for these individuals (i.e., 0)q,r( ii u ). This may have 
happened because respondents did not find the information credible, or simply because they 
had a strong prior belief. Consistent with this explanation, richer and more educated 
individuals have greater confidence in their assesment of their own relative rank, as discussed 
in Section 4.3. 
Finaly, respondents who were informed that they were relatively poorer than they had 
thought became more supportive of redistribution to the poor when informed about their true 
income rank. Moreover, these effects are larger and systematicaly significant for those with 
biases greater than one, that is, for those with higher degrees of misperception. These efects 
are sizeable: the difference in the support for redistribution between treatment and control 
group amounts roughly to half the difference in those variables between the top and botom 
quintiles of the individuals in the control group. 
6.Conclusion 
The motivation for undertaking this study was the apparent lack of evidence regarding the 
accuracy and origins of perceptions of the income distribution, which play a crucial (though 
implicit) role in political economy and public finance models. The study focuses on a simple 
mechanism, whereby agents extrapolate from their reference group without accounting for 
the selection process underlying the formation of the group owing to either informational or 
cognitive limitations. A tailored household survey provided evidence of the presence of 
sizeable systematic biases in perceptions about relative income in Argentina. Furthermore, 
the analysis uncovered suggestive evidence that the incorect extrapolation of information 
from reference groups can be a powerful explanation for the observed biases. The systematic 
biases documented in this paper and their consequences can arise in any society. 
This study involved the implementation of an original survey experiment in the field 
in which a randomly assigned group of respondents were provided with accurate information 
about their ranking in the income distribution as a form of feedback concerning their 
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responses. Confronting agents who had biased perceptions with this information had a 
significant efect on their stated preferences for redistribution: those who overestimated their 
relative position (who thought that they were relatively richer than they were) demanded 
more redistribution. To the degree that the information treatment managed to correct biased 
distributional perceptions, these results can be interpreted as evidence of the causal effect of 
misperceptions on political atitudes. This mechanism provides an alternative explanation for 
the low levels of redistribution observed in modern democracies.26 Having accurate 
information about the income distribution might induce agents to beter calibrate their 
demands for redistribution. The results in this paper support Romer’s (2003) discussion of the 
possible welfare-improving efects of subsidizing information and Besley’s (2007) remarks 
about the potential of information for improving policies, although the impact of the biases in 
the eficiency of redistribution should also be considered (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2001). 
The role of misconceptions in political economy has been studied before (Romer, 
2003; Slemrod, 2006). While Besley (2007) highlights the benefits to be derived from 
incorporating notions of dispersed and limited information for modern political economy, 
building-in more specific factors, such as biased perceptions of the distribution, can further 
enrich political economy models and empirical applications. It can also provide explanations 
for other puzzles in the literature, such as those pointed out by Bartels’ (2008) results on the 
reduced responsiveness of representatives to low-income voters. More generaly, concepts 
such as inequality, self-interest and the median voter can be adapted in their application to 
political economy outcomes when misperceptions and misconceptions play a role. 
The findings in this paper indicate how perceptions may afect stated preferences for 
redistribution. Further research could focus on the impact of biases and information on actual 
behavior, such as voting paterns. Moreover, it would be interesting to explore how 
misperceptions affect individuals’ reactions to redistributive policies (e.g., as expressed 
through charitable contributions and tax evasion) and to learn whether the provision of 
information on broader issues that go beyond such maters as rules and regulations (e.g., 
Chety and Saez, 2009) may have implications for public finance models. Finaly, the results 
of the analyses conducted in connection with this study could be atributable either to limited 
information or to limited cognitive ability – further research wil be needed in order to 
pinpoint the source of the observed biases in distributional perceptions. 
                              
26 Since the bias affects preferences for redistribution for relatively poorer individuals, it is reminiscent of the 
Marxian notion of false consciousness. Olin Wright’s (2009) discussion of false consciousness states: “Ideology 
is seen as preventing workers from understanding the nature of their oppression and the possibilities of its 
transformation. The absence of efective struggle for socialism, then, is at least in part explained by the 
pervasiveness of these cognitive distortions.” 
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Tables 
Source for al tables: Own calculations based on the Survey on Distributional Perceptions and Redistribution. 
 























Lowest 1.62 4.60 2.98 0.85 3.02 0.04 -0.04
Second 3.47 4.96 1.49 0.71 1.71 0.16 -0.21
Third 5.53 5.38 -0.14 0.30 0.60 0.40 -0.74
Fourth 7.54 5.89 -1.64 0.07 0.09 0.81 -1.73
Highest 9.35 6.48 -2.88 0.00 0.00 0.97 -2.88
Total (N=1060) 6.12 5.60 -0.53 0.30 0.75 0.55 -1.28
 
Notes: the bias is defined as the perception of income decile minus objective income decile. (See Table A1 for detailed definitions.) 
 
Table 2. Determinants of perceived own-income decile 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Objective income decile 0.2452 0.2099 -0.0168 F-test† 0.0048 0.0109
[0.0245]*** [0.0280]*** [0.0944] [0.1237] [0.1228]
Rank within locality 0.2151 0.2311 0.2002 0.2288
[0.0868]** [0.1195]* [0.1114]* [0.1096]**




Constant 4.0916 3.8997 4.2961 4.2846 4.1199 3.976
[0.1798]*** [0.2266]*** [0.2659]*** [0.4379]*** [0.6554]*** [0.6709]***
Observations 1054 1054 1054 1054 1045 1045
R-squared 0.12 0.18 0.19 0.19 0.22 0.22
Neighborhood fixed efects No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual controls No No No No Yes Yes
Levels of objective decile as indicatorNo No No Yes No No










Dependent variable: Perceived own-income decile
 
Notes: Standard errors clustered by neighborhood in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. † F-test 
of joint significance for nine objective income decile indicator variables: p-value of 0.2468. The individual controls in the 
regressions in columns 5 and 6 include the sex of the respondent, whether the respondent is the household head, his or her age, 
indicators for his or her education level (from primary incomplete and lower up to postgraduate degree), whether the respondent has 
a spouse, indicators for the spouse’s education level (if present), whether the respondent is a public employee, whether the 
respondent is unionized, and whether the household has any extra source of income besides labor earnings. The “rank within 
locality” variable was normalized to the same 1-10 scale used for the objective and subjective deciles. The “neighborhoods” 
corespond to 41 sampling points covering a smal set of street blocks. These neighborhoods contain 26 households on average in the 
sample. The 10 “localities” represent larger geographical aggregates of the Greater Buenos Aires metropolitan area, with 106 
observations on average. 
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Table 3. Biased perceptions of income distribution and preferences for redistribution: Experimental 
results. 
Treatment group [obs.] 0.459[296] 0.532[84] 0.538[150] 0.559[99]
Control group [obs.] 0.463[286] 0.495[72] 0.509[152] 0.500[112]
Diference [s.e.] -0.003[0.018] 0.036[0.041] 0.029[0.029] 0.059[0.034]**
Conditional dif. [s.e.] -0.003[0.015] 0.015[0.066] 0.071[0.026]*** 0.096[0.042]**
Treatment group [obs.] -0.067[296] 0.126[84] 0.109[150] 0.192[99]
Control group [obs.] -0.063[286] 0.026[72] 0.048[152] 0.009[112]
Diference [s.e.] -0.004[0.049] 0.101[0.108] 0.060[0.084] 0.182[0.094]**
Conditional dif. [s.e.] -0.004[0.045] 0.035[0.183] 0.179[0.082]** 0.259[0.116]**
Treatment group [obs.] 0.111[296] 0.226[84] 0.212[151] 0.242[99]
Control group [obs.] 0.108[287] 0.153[72] 0.176[153] 0.150[113]
Diference [s.e.] 0.003[0.026] 0.073[0.063] 0.035[0.045] 0.092[0.054]**
Conditional dif. [s.e.] 0.010[0.021] 0.063[0.119] 0.084[0.046]* 0.132[0.067]*
Treatment group [obs.] 0.284[296] 0.381[84] 0.424[151] 0.444[99]
Control group [obs.] 0.303[287] 0.347[72] 0.373[153] 0.381[113]
Diference [s.e.] -0.019[0.038] 0.034[0.078] 0.051[0.056] 0.064[0.068]
Conditional dif. [s.e.] -0.024[0.034] -0.010[0.105] 0.118[0.046]** 0.124[0.071]*
Treatment group [obs.] 0.866[292] 0.788[85] 0.719[153] 0.687[99]
Control group [obs.] 0.831[284] 0.845[71] 0.742[155] 0.722[115]
Diference [s.e.] 0.035[0.030] -0.057[0.063] -0.023[0.051] -0.035[0.063]
Conditional dif. [s.e.] 0.044[0.030] -0.024[0.082] 0.029[0.054] 0.031[0.064]
Standardized mean (Kling et al. 2007), support questions (money, food, jobs)
Government should help the poor with money
Government should help the poor with food














More than one decile
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Mean of three government-support-to-the-poor questions (money, food, jobs)
 
Notes: * represents statistical significance at the 10 percent level; ** at the 5 percent level; and * at the 1 percent level. These levels 
corespond to the test for the unconditional diference – the p-value for μT<μC for cases of negative bias (column 1), μT=μC for those with no bias (column 2) and for μT>μC for those with positive bias (columns 3-4). The conditional diference is computed from a regression of the outcome of interest against a treatment indicator, neighborhood fixed efects and a series of individual controls. 
The conditional diference is the estimate of the coeficient of the treatment indicator, and the significance levels underlying the stars 
are derived from standard erors clustered at the neighborhood level. The individual controls in the regressions include the sex of the 
respondent, whether the respondent is the household head, his or her age, indicators for his or her education level (from primary 
incomplete and lower up to postgraduate degree), whether the respondent has a spouse, indicators for the spouse’s education level (if 
present), whether the respondent is a public employee, whether the respondent is unionized, and whether the household has any extra 
source of income besides labor earnings. The bias is defined as the perception of own income decile minus objective income decile. 
See Table A1 for further variable definitions. 
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Figures 
Figure 1. Ilustration of diferences between population and reference-group income distributions 
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Figure 2. Distribution of objective and perceived own-income decile 
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by perceived own-income decile
Average confidence in response (1 to 4 scale)
 Note: Based on the auxiliary February 2012 household survey, Greater La Plata, Argentina (see Section 4.3 for details). Answer to the 
question: “How much confidence do you have about the reply you just gave?” referring to the previous question on the individual’s 
perceived own-income decile. The options were “Not sure at al”, “Somewhat sure”, “Sure” and “Very sure” (1 to 4). The sample mean is 
represented by the solid horizontal line. 95 percent confidence intervals computed for each decile. N=302. 
 
 
Figure 4. Preferences for redistribution – agreement with “help the poor with money” question, 






1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
proportion agreeing by perceived and objective own-income decile
Question: 'Government should help the poor with money'
Perceived own-income decile Objective income decile
 Notes: Own calculations based on the Survey on Distributional Perceptions and Redistribution. See Table A1 for definitions. 
Observations for individuals in the control group (i.e., individuals that were not provided feedback about the accuracy of their income 





Appendix tables: Table A1. Variable definitions and descriptive statistics 
Variable Description - relevant question from the Survey on Distributional Perceptions and Redistribution March 2009, Greater Buenos Aires, Argentina Mean SD Min. Max. Obs.
Objective income decile
The interviewer displayed a table with income ranges computed by the researchers, coresponding to the deciles of the distribution of total household
income for Argentina at the time of the survey. Question:I wil show you a table with levels of income. Please indicate where, approximately, you would say
that your household is located, considering al income in your household from every source (work, government transfer programs, pensions, rent, etc.) (1)
Less than X; (2) X to Y; .. ; (10) More than Z.
6.12 2.46 1 10 1060
Perception of own income 
decile
The interviewer made a statement and asked the folowing question:There are 10 milion households in Argentina. Of those 10 milion, how many do you
think have an income lower than yours? (1) 0 to 1 milion; (2) between 1 and 2 milion; … ; (10) 9 to 10 milion. 5.60 1.77 1 10 1060
Bia s The bias is constructed as the level of theobjective income decileminus that of theperceived own-income decile. It is negative for those who considerthemselves to be in a lower position than they realy are, and it is positive for those who consider themselves to be in a higher position than they realy are. -0.53 2.49 -8 7 1060
Treatment
Half of the sample was assigned to a "treatment" questionnaire with the folowing specific intervention from the interviewer, which was not present inthe
"control" version. The interviewers alternated questionnaire types. The intervention consisted of comparing the answer from theobjective income decile (X)
to that of theperception of own income decile (Y), and stating accordingly: The interviewer read the folowing statement (with X and Y being determined by
previous answers):“Based on your income level, the latest studies conducted by the University indicate that there are X milion households with a lower
income than yours, while you stated that there were Y.” The interviewer then read out one of the three folowing statements, depending on the accuracy of the 
X/Y comparison: (1)“In fact, there are more households with a lower income than yours than you believed”,(2)“You were right about how many households
have a lower income than yours”, or (3) “In fact, there are fewer households with a lower incme than yours than you thought".
0.514 0.500 0 1 1060
Rank within locality
This variable is constructed using theobjective income decilevariable for each respondent and computing his/her ranking within his/her area of residence,
where the 41 sampling points were aggregated to 10 geographic localities. The rank within the locality is computed using al observations in each areain
the sample and transformed to a 1-10 scale (as the objective and subjective income decile variables). It is computed as the number of households with a
lower income than that of the respondent divided by the total number of households.
5.42 2.48 1.08 9.78 1060
Respondent has friends from 
a l  soci a l cl a sse s
This is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the respondent states that he or she has friends from al social classes when asked the question:"Among your 
friends and co-workers, would you say that there are individuals from al social classes (1), or, if not, that most of your friends belong to the lower class (2),
the middle class (3), or the upper class (4)?"
0.376 0.485 0 1 1060
Help the poor with money "Do you think that the government should help poor people by giving them money? (1) Yes; (0) No." 0.148 0.355 0 1 1049
Help the poor with food "Do you think that the government should help poor people by giving them food? (1) Yes; (0) No." 0.336 0.472 0 1 1049
Help the poor find jobs "Do you think that the government should help poor people by helping them to find a good job? (1) Yes; (0) No." 0.982 0.133 0 1 1052
Support for redistribution: 
Mean Variable representing the mean of the response to the three previous questions. 0.487 0.237 0 1 1040
Support for redistribution: 
Standardized mean
Aggregate variable based on thehelp with money,help with foodandhelp find jobsquestions. The process consists of demeaning each variable,
converting each to efect sizes by dividing the result by the control group’s standard deviation, and taking the average of the efect sizes (Kling et al., 2007) -0.002 0.6509 -2.87 1.35 1040
Respondent made donations 
in the past 12 months "Have you donated money, food or clothes to any charity or individual in need in the past twelve months? Yes (1); No (0)" 0.808 0.394 0 1 1045
Sex (1) Male; (0) Female. 0.489 0.500 0 1 1060
Age Age in years. 49.2 15.4 17 88 1051
Educational level of the 
respondent or his/her spouse
Indicator variables for the folowing categories:(1) Primary incomplete; (2) Primary complete; (3) Secondary incomplete; (4) Secondary complete; (5)
Undergraduate incomplete; (6) Undergraduate complete; (7) Postgraduate. This table reports the average of these categories for the respondent. 4.049 1.599 1 7 1054
Household head "Are you the head of the household? (1) Yes; (0) No." 0.757 0.429 0 1 1060 Note: the sample is restricted to the 1,060 observations with non-missing bias information (objective and perceived income decile), which corresponds to the sample analyzed in the paper. 
Further notes below. 
 
Notes to Table A1 
The use of income intervals significantly reduces non-response rates, as shown in a 2007 pilot and in large-
scale international projects such as the Galup World Pol, which concentrate on total household income rather 
than on its components. The boundaries of the intervals corespond to actual deciles of the distribution, which 
facilitated the comparison of objective and perceived rank as implemented in the experimental design. 
To ensure comparability between the objective and subjective income ranks, interviewers were instructed to 
impute the lowest category for respondents who considered that less than 1 milion households had a lower 
income than theirs, the next-highest category for those who responded with any number between 1 and 2 
milion, and so forth until reaching the highest category (10) for those who reported any number between 9 
and 10 milion. 
It should be noted that, as a result of the Argentine government’s intervention in the operations of the National 
Statistics and Census Institute (INDEC) in 2007, the availability of reliable household survey microdata and of 
oficial income distribution indicators was quite limited until 2010. To construct the deciles for 2009, the team 
updated the boundaries of total household monthly income deciles from 2007 using information from 
INDEC’s monthly index of wage levels, which continued to be published. When the results of the 2009 
national household survey became available in 2010, al of the estimated decile boundaries fel within the 95-
percent interval of the actual points in the microdata. 










t ratio of 
diference
Age 49.99 48.50 1.49 -1.6
Head of household indicator 0.760 0.755 0.005 -0.21
Male indicator 0.470 0.490 -0.020 -0.65
Number of adults living in the household 1.809 1.830 -0.021 -0.28
Number of children (14 and below) in household 0.737 0.739 -0.002 -0.04
Number of own children 2.032 1.917 0.115 -1.33
No spouse in household 0.112 0.133 -0.021 -1.06
Household has fixed phone line 0.804 0.832 -0.028 -1.22
Household rents dweling 0.245 0.221 0.024 -0.94
Number of members working 1.571 1.569 0.002 -0.03
Household receives government transfers (welfare) 0.047 0.042 0.005 -0.39
Household has income sources besides labor earnings 0.079 0.070 0.009 -0.55
Some primary education (complete or incomplete) 0.228 0.216 0.012 -0.47
Some secondary education (complete or incomplete) 0.423 0.413 0.010 -0.34
Some higher education (complete, incomplete) 0.349 0.371 -0.022 -0.75
Housewife 0.169 0.152 0.017 -0.75
Wage earner 0.275 0.294 -0.019 -0.7
Liberal profession 0.166 0.149 0.017 -0.77
Pensioner 0.159 0.123 0.036 -1.71
Looking for a job 0.043 0.077 -0.034 -2.37
Working 0.654 0.689 -0.035 -1.24
Unionized 0.224 0.232 -0.008 -0.33
Public sector worker 0.140 0.138 0.002 -0.08
Informal employment 0.355 0.357 -0.002 -0.08
Perceives household as poor 0.198 0.238 -0.040 -1.62
Log of assessed minimum living income 8.128 8.108 0.020 -0.73
Ha s fri e nds from a l  soci a l cl a sse s 0.361 0.389 -0.028 -0.98
Perceived own-income decile 5.676 5.514 0.162 -1.51
Objective income decile 6.193 6.021 0.172 -1.14
 
Notes: the table includes al 1,115 observations in the database, including those with incomplete or missing answers. Schefe’s 
method for simultaneous testing provides the critical t-statistic for the significance of each of the tests in the table. For a 95 percent 
level of significance, with tests and 1,114 degrees of freedom, the critical value is 6.64. None of the differences is significantly 
diferent from zero according to this method. 
 
 
